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NOTES AND COMMENT
"The rule that functions well produces a title deed to
recognition. Only in determining how it functions we must
not view it too narrowly. We must not sacrifice the gen-
eral to the particular. We must not throw to the winds the
advantages of consistency and uniformity to do justice in
the instance. * * * But within the limits thus set, within a
range over which choice moves, the final principle of selec-
tion for judges * * * is one of fitness to an end." (Italics
ours.) 20
The end reached in the case of Ultramares Corporation v.
Touche, as we have said, was evidently the result of this method:
the duty of the Courts, as seen by Judge Cardozo, "to declare the
law in accordance with reason and justice" as "a phase of the duty
to declare it with custon." 21 The modern progressive tendency
towards liberalism and freedom from the old fetters of precedent
which so often stifle justice, is, wisely applied, highly desirable.
ESTHER L. KOPPELMAN.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS BY CHANGE IN
THE ADJECTIVE LAW.
While we are all familiar with such general statements that
"due process does not guarantee to a citizen of a state any particu-
lar form of procedure, its requirements are satisfied if the defen-
dant has had notice and an opportunity to be heard," ' yet at times
it is difficult to determine what constitutes notice or opportunity
to be heard. Generally speaking, this statement is true. The hear-
ing need not be a judicial proceeding, as the decision may be en-
trusted to an executive officer or administrative board.2 A state
may repeal a statute of limitation and thereby revive a debt that
had already been barred without violating the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.3 A state may change the number of jurors in a criminal case
0Ibid. at 103.
21Ibid. at 106. (Italics ours.)
1Dohany v. Rogers, 281 U. S. 362. 369, 50 Sup. Ct. 299 (1929).
2U. S. v. Ju Toy, 198 U. S. 253, 25 Sup. Ct. 644 (1905).
'Campbell v. Holt, 115 U. S. 620, 6 Sup. Ct. 209 (1885): "No -man
promises to pay money with any view to being released from that obligation
by lapse of time. It violates no right of his, therefore when the legislature
says, time shall be no bar, though such was the law when the contract was
made. The authorities we have cited, especially in this Court, show that no
right is destroyed when the law restores a remedy which has been lost. * * *
We can see no right which the promisor has in the law which permits him to
plead lapse of time instead of payment which shall prevent the legislature from
repealing the law."
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or abolish the jury system entirely without violating due process.4
An erroneous decision on a question of substantive law presents
no federal question.5 It is well settled that a state may consider
proof of one fact presumptive evidence of another, provided there
is a rational connection between them, and may also change the
burden of proof.6 However, a purely arbitrary presumption of law
such as that directors of a bankrupt bank are prima facie guilty
of fraud has been held unconstitutional. 7 A state may not render
a personal judgment against a non-resident who, or foreign cor-
poration which, has not been served within its borders or subjected
itself to the jurisdiction of the state.8
A more important aspect of this question presents itself in a
series of cases which deal with trials that in form afford due process
but in substance deny it. There more subtle distinctions must be
drawn. In the famous Frank 9 case an appeal from an order re-
fusing an application for a writ of habeas corpus was taken to the
Supreme Court. The allegations in the petition set out that the
trial was conducted in a court room packed with spectators and
surrounded by a crowd outside, all strongly hostile to the petitioner;
that the trial Judge in the presence of the jury conferred with the
Chief of Police of Atlanta and the Colonel of the Fifth Georgia
Regiment as to precautionary measures to be taken in the event
of an unpopular verdict. On the morning of the last day of the
trial the prosecutor was warmly applauded as he entered the court.
The Judge before charging the jury advised the defendant and
his counsel to leave the court, fearing violence if they remained.
There was more applause as each juror was polled. The majority
opinion held that due process was not denied as the defendant had
an appeal to the trial term after the verdict and to an appellate
tribunal, both of whom decided against him on the facts. The
majority opinion 'further held that even if jurisdiction was lost at
the trial it was regained by the judicial calm in which the proceed-
'Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581, 20 Sup. Ct. 488 (1898): "There is no
intimation here that among the privileges and immunities of a citizen of the
United States are the right of a trial by jury in a state court for a state
offense and the right to be exempt from any trial for an infamous crime unless
upon presentment by a grand jury. * * * Due process of law is process due
according to the law of the land. This process in the States is regulated by
the law of the state."
'Mosley v. Lake Shore & M. S. Ry., 146 U. S. 162, 13 Sup. Ct. 64 (1892).
'Hawes v. Georgia, 258 U. S. 1, 42 Sup. Ct. 204 (1922). The Court
cited with approval Hawkins v. Bleakley, 243 U. S. 210, 37 Sup. Ct. 255 (1917) :
"The establishment of presumptions and of burdens of proof is clearly within
the domain of the state governments."
Manley v. Georgia, 271 U. S. 1, 46 Sup. Ct. 415 (1929).
'Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714 (1878); Old Wayne Mutual Life Assn.
v. McDonough, 204 U. S. 8, 27 Sup. Ct. 236 (1907) : "No judgment of a court
is due process of law if rendered without jurisdiction in the court or notice
to the party."
'Frank v. Mangum, 237 U. S. 309, 35 Sup. Ct. 582 (1915).
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ings before the Appellate Courts were conducted. A minority
opinion written by Justice Holmes held that since a constitutional
question was involved the federal Court should have tried the al-
legations and determined the facts for itself.
In a later and somewhat similar case 10 in which the petition
of five negroes for a writ of habeas corpus contained the usual
allegations that they were hurried to a conviction under pressure
of a mob and that the trial was a mere mockery and that the at-
torney who attempted to defend them was indicted for barratry,
the Supreme Court, Justice Holmes writing the opinion, held that
although the petitioners had three appeals in the state courts it was
incumbent on the District Judge to try the facts for himself. This
case would seem to establish the proposition that a trial is none in
substance whatever it may be in form if the verdict does no more
than register the bidding of a mob. Not alone must the trial be
conducted free from duress but the Judge must be disinterested.
Thus a conviction before a Justice of the Peace whose fees are pro-
portioned to the fines that he imposes, is not due process."
A recent case 12 decided by the Supreme Court does much to
chart the limitation on state action in this field of the law. Plain-
tiff, a banking institution, brought suit in the courts of Missouri
to restrain the treasurer of Henry County from attempting to col-
lect taxes assessed against them on shares of stock on the grounds
that the assessor had discriminated against them insofar as he had
systematically and intentionally assessed bank stock at its full value,
whereas all other classes of property were assessed at 75% or less
of their true value. The answer opposed relief in equity on the
grounds that under the Missouri Statutes 13 a remedy was provided
by an appeal to the State Board of Equalization. The Missouri
Court disregarded this contention but held that plaintiff was not
entitled to equitable relief as he could have appealed to the State
Tax Commission. The possibility of relief before the Tax Com-
mission was not suggested by anyone before the Court rendered
its decision. But under the decision 14 application to the Tax Com-
mission could not be made after the tax books had been delivered
to the collector. This was done about October 1, 1927. The opin-
ion was handed down June 29, 1929. Six years previous this
same Court in construing the statute in question 15 held that the
tax commission had no such power, saying that it was "prepos-
terous" and "unthinkable" that the statute conferred any such power
1°Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U. S. 86, 43 Sup. Ct. 265 (1923).
Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U. S. 510, 47 Sup. Ct. 437 (1927).
= Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Say. Co. v. Hill, 281 U. S. 673, 50 Sup. Ct.
451 (1930).
"Secs. 12820, 12827, 12853, 12857 Missouri Revised Statutes of 1919.14Laclede Land & Improvement Co. v. State Tax Commission, 295 Mo.
298, 243 S. W. 887 (1922).
"1bid. note 13.
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and, that such a construction would violate the State Constitution.
A petition for a rehearing was seasonably made reciting the above
facts, but was denied without an opinion. On appeal the Supreme
Court, Justice Brandeis writing the opinion, held that while the
courts of a state have the supreme power to interpret and declare
the written and unwritten laws of the state, and while the mere
fact that a state court has rendered an erroneous decision on a
question of state law, or has overruled principles or doctrines es-
tablished by previous decision on which a party relied, does not
give rise to a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment or otherwise
confer appellate jurisdiction on the federal courts, yet in the pres-
ent case the state Court by refusing to hear plaintiff's complaint
because plaintiff did not first seek an administrative remedy, which
in fact was never available, and which is not now open to it, and
by denying to it the only remedy that was ever available for the
enforcement of its right to prevent the seizure of its property, de-
prived the plaintiff of due process. The Court further stated that
the federal guaranty of due process extends to state action through
its judicial as well as through its legislative, executive, or adminis-
trative branch of government.
Judge Cardozo seemed to summarize this phase of the law in
one of his publications when he said, "The guaranty of liberty
in the constitutional law of the nation and its constituent common-
wealths is a guaranty that claims and immunities conceived of at
any given stage of civilization as primary and basic shall be pre-
served against destruction or encroachment by the agencies of gov-
ernment. We may classify under this head some of the decisions
defining those indispensable elements of justice that are essential
to the attainment of due process of law. There must be judgment
after notice and a hearing. There must be trial by an impartial
Judge without interest in the event. There must be calmness and
deliberation, or at least the fair opportunity for them." 16
The question naturally suggests itself how far may a state
modernize its procedure or deviate from the traditional modes of
trials without violating the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment? Much of the criticism of the law from lay sources
is due to its archaic forms of procedure. In recent years the pro-
fession has been keenly aware of this problem and many efforts
have been made to eliminate anachronisms in this field of the law.
While we must not be unmindful of the warning of Dean Pound
that "The general security forbids that trial judges experiment at
the expense of life, liberty and property" 17 it seems certain that
the future will bring many radical changes in our present systems
of adjective law. Although there has been some confusion of
thought on this subject, due to. the Federal Constitution guarantee-
"Cardozo, Paradoxes of Legal Science, (1927) 123.
'Pound, Science and Legal Procedure (1928) 8 Amer. J. of Psychiatry,
33, 36.
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ing certain modes of procedure, in federal cases, it is submitted
that there is nothing in the Fourteenth Amendment that forbids
a state from keeping its rules of procedure and evidence abreast
of the most enlightened views of modern jurisprudence.
C. JOSEPHa DANAHY.
BEST EVIDENCE RULE-ORAL PROOF OF CONTENTS OF WRITINGS.
It is common learning in the law of evidence that a writing or
document is the best evidence of what it contains. "Indeed the
term 'best evidence' has been described as a convenient short de-
scription of the rule as to proving the contents of a writing." I
Therefore, generally, oral testimony will not be admitted to
prove what was contained in a writing; the document itself must
be produced and offered in evidence.2 The reasons for this rule
are founded on the uncertainty of oral testimony based on recollec-
tion, and the inability to reproduce properly such characteristics as
form, handwriting and physical appearance. 3 But, like most laws
of a pseudo-science, this general rule has several exceptions, and it
is with one of these exceptions that we are concerned.
Broadly stated it may be said that when the writing is not in
issue and is merely collateral to the subject of the action, parol
evidence of its contents is admissible without otherwise accounting
for its absence.4 Expediency demands that we curtail our inquiry
from examining into every writing, no matter how remote. 5 Briefly
'Jones, Law of Evidence (3rd ed. 1924), p. 286.
'Arizona Fire Ins. Co. v. Dillingham, 23 Ariz. 508, 205 Pac. 589 (1922);
Butler v. Mail & Express Pub. Co., 171 N. Y. 208, 63 N. E. 951 (1902);
Mahaney v. Carr, 175 N. Y. 454, 67 N. E. 903 (1903); Matter-of Smith, 61
Hun 101, 151 N. Y. Supp. 425 (1891); 2 Wigmore on Evidence (1923 Sec.
1178. (The rule has been held to apply to Workmen's Compensation cases.)
Baum v. Industrial Commission, 288 Ill. 516, 123 N. E. 625, 6 A. L. R. 1243(1919). (The application of this rule should not be confused with the parol
evidence rule which is binding only on parties to the instrument but not on
third persons.) Follinsbee v. Sawyer, 157 N. Y. 196, 51 N. E. 994 (1898).(The best evidence rule applies to all who seek to use a writing whether or
not they are parties to it.) I.nfra note 33; cf. Miles v. Walker, 179 N. C.
479, 484, 102 S. E. 884, 886 (1920).
'2 Wigmore, mspra note 2, Sec. 1179.
' Coonrod v. Madden, 126 Ind. 192. 25 N. E. 1102 (1890); Gilbert v.
Duncan, 29 N. J. L. 133 (1861); Fairchild v. Fairchild, 64 N. Y. 471 (1876);
Grover v. Morris, 73 N. Y. 473 (1878) ; Daniels v. Smith, 130 N. Y. 696, 29 N.
E. 1098 (1892) ; Bowen v. Newport National Bank, 11 Hun 226 (N. Y., 1877) ;
Cullinan v. Furthman, 70 App. Div. 110, 75 N. Y. Supp. 90 (Ist Dept. 1902);
Thayer's Cases on Evidence (1900), p. 747; 2 Wigmore, supra note 2, Sec.
1252.
assey v. Farmer's National Bank, 113 Ill. 334, 338 (1885).
